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Trial Tactics

Authentication and
Hearsay: Which Trumps?
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

S

uppose that a document is offered by the government as a defendant’s statement to prove the
truth of its contents, and the defendant objects
that he or she did not write or adopt the statement. To
decide admissibility, does the trial judge use Federal
Rule of Evidence 104(a) or 104(b)? Or does the judge
use both? The answer should be clear after 40 years
of experience with the evidence rules, but it remains
cloudy for many courts and lawyers.

The Difference

Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) sets forth this standard:
(a) In General. The court must decide any
preliminary question about whether a witness is
qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by
evidence rules, except those on privilege.
It makes clear that the judge may rely on inadmissible evidence such as hearsay that would be excluded
under Rule 802 in making a ruling.
Rule 104(b), on the other hand, sets forth a different standard:
(b) Relevance that Depends on a Fact. When
the relevance of evidence depends on whether a
fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient
to support a finding that the fact does exist. The
court may admit the proposed evidence on the
condition that the proof be introduced later.
On its face, Rule 104(b) makes clear that it operates similarly to Rule 901(a), which states that “[t]o
satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item
is what the proponent claims it is.”
So, Rule 104(a) permits a judge to consider inadmissible evidence in making an evidence ruling while
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Rules 104(b) and 901(a) require the judge to focus on
evidence that actually is admitted. In the discussion
that follows, each mention of Rule 104(b) should be
assumed to also apply to Rule 901(a).

A Sample Case

United States v. Harvey, 117 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 1997),
illustrates the conflict that may arise when a defendant
objects that a statement is not his or hers. The defendant, Roderick Harvey, set up a campsite for himself
and his dog, Drigo, in the Shawnee National Forest,
which is located in southern Illinois. He was charged
with cultivating several plots of marijuana that law
enforcement officials discovered near the campsite.
When law enforcement officials first discovered the
marijuana plots during aerial surveillance, Harvey was
in a hospital and rehabilitation center recovering from
serious injuries suffered when he collided with a truck
while riding a bicycle. He was in the center for approximately six weeks after the marijuana was discovered,
and from the outset he expressed concern about his
dog being left somewhere in Shawnee National Forest.
It took law enforcement officials two weeks after
spying the marijuana plots from the air to actually
reach them on foot in an isolated, rugged location. They
came upon some plants that were six to seven feet tall
and were near a well-developed campsite containing
two tents. The officers saw no people at or around the
campsite but encountered a large, emaciated German
shepherd that growled and barked at them.
The officers returned to the campsite a couple of
days after first reaching it and installed vibrationactivated video surveillance equipment that they
periodically checked for more than a month without
finding any evidence of a human presence at the site.
Two days after Harvey left the center, officers conducting live surveillance of the campsite saw him at
the site moving around with the aid of crutches. The
officers arrested Harvey, searched the campsite, and
found freshly-cut marijuana and a black satchel near
where Harvey had been sleeping in one of the tents.
Two notebooks found inside the satchel contained
diary-like entries and things-to-do lists. There were
references to planting dates, planting conditions, and
the grow plots around the campsite. One crossed-out
entry stated “20 plants into ground up top today.”
Officers also found another entry that referred to the
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws (NORML), numerous entries mentioning a dog
named Drigo, miscellaneous papers bearing Harvey’s
name, and a copy of a magazine generally devoted
to the cultivation of marijuana. Officers testified that
Harvey asked about his dog “Drago” (the name as
recalled by one of the arresting officers) and the status of his camping gear while being transported to
federal court.
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Harvey objected at trial to the admission of the diary
entries, but the trial judge admitted them over objection
despite the fact that the government did not offer any
handwriting evidence at trial. On appeal, the government argued that the entries were admissible because
only the individual who planted the marijuana could
have made them. The court of appeals found this argument to be unpersuasive:

Some cases seem to treat the inquiries under the
two rules as identical, meaning that authenticated
statements by a party-opponent are automatically
not hearsay. Indeed, the admissibility of hearsay is routinely treated as a preliminary question
under Rule 104(b) which, like Rule 901, requires
only “evidence sufficient to support a finding.”

The court nonetheless found no abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial judge and explained as follows:

On the other hand, Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987),
states that the Federal Rules of Evidence “nowhere
define the standard of proof the court must observe
in resolving these [preliminary] questions.” The
Bourjaily Court therefore held that preliminary
facts relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E)—the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule—must be
proven under a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard. Since Bourjaily, we have stated more
generally that “[w]hen making preliminary factual
inquiries about the admissibility of evidence under
a hearsay exception, the district court must base its
findings on the preponderance of the evidence.”
United States v. Franco, 874 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th
Cir. 1989). The admission of evidence under Rule
801 may therefore require a higher standard of
proof than the prima facie showing required to
authenticate evidence under Rule 901.
(Id. at 1049–50 (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).)

Rule 901(b)(4) allows evidence to be authenticated by “[a]ppearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.”
The written materials were found in an isolated
and remote area where law enforcement agents
observed no one other than Harvey. The materials were within Harvey’s campsite; indeed, they
were next to Harvey’s own bed. The writings also
make numerous references to Harvey’s beloved
dog, Drigo. These distinctive characteristics and
circumstances are sufficient to support a finding
that the materials were written by Harvey.
(Id. (alteration in original).)

In the end, the court of appeals failed to decide
which rule governed and instead concluded that
“[r]egardless of whether the authentication and hearsay thresholds are identical, we find that the written
materials satisfy the higher preponderance of the evidence standard.” (Id. at 1050.) It appears that other
courts believe that it is sufficient for the judge to find
simply that Rule 104(b) is satisfied and that it is not
to satisfy the higher standard of Rule 104(a). One
example is United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414 (9th Cir.
1995). In still other cases, courts address the evidence
question as simply a hearsay question without focusing on authentication. One example is United States
v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314 (10th Cir. 2014).

The court of appeals then turned to the question of
what standard a trial judge must use in deciding on
admissibility:

Getting to the Right Answer

The Government’s overall objective in this case
was to prove that Harvey was responsible for the
marijuana plants around the campsite. To prove
that, the Government offered the written materials
found there. But to authenticate those materials
as Harvey’s writing, the Government argues that
only Harvey could have written them because
only the planter of the marijuana would keep
those kinds of records. The Government, in other
words, assumes that Harvey planted the marijuana—the very point it must ultimately prove.
This is circular reasoning at its worst. The references to the marijuana plants suggest the materials
were written by the planter of the marijuana, but
those references hardly imply that Harvey is the
author/planter.
(Id. at 1049.)

If the notes and diaries were truly written by Harvey, they would also not be hearsay because they
would be statements made by a party-opponent.
See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). The question for
us, however, is whether the finding of authenticity under Rule 901 is sufficient to make the
written materials nonhearsay under Rule 801.

So the question is which standard applies. The right answer
is that the trial judge must use both Rule 104(b) and Rule
104(a). A simple example can help to explain this.
Assume (1) the government charges a defendant
with operating a website that is used to transmit child
pornography and that there are pictures and statements
on the website, (2) the government wants to admit the
pictures, (3) the government wants to admit the statements for their truth, and (4) the defendant objects on
hearsay and authentication grounds.

Assume also that the trial judge has a hearing at which
the government calls a law enforcement officer to testify
that “I spoke with three longtime friends of the defendant, who told me that the defendant told each of them
that the website was his.” If the trial judge believes the
officer, the judge could find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the website was operated by the defendant,
even though the officer’s testimony is inadmissible hearsay. Rule 104(a) allows this. If the trial judge makes the
preponderance finding, this would be sufficient for the
judge to find that Rule 801(d)(2)(A) is satisfied as to the
statements. But nothing in Rule 104(a) allows the judge
to admit the officer’s testimony regarding what the three
friends said, and it is highly unlikely that their statements
would satisfy any hearsay exception. Therefore, there
would be no admitted evidence to tie the defendant to
the website, the government could not authenticate the
photos as being posted by the defendant, and, therefore, the judge could not admit the photos into evidence
because Rule 104(b) requires admissible evidence connecting the photos to the defendant.
Can it really be that the statements could be admitted
because the judge assessed them under the hearsay rule
and Rule 104(a), but the photos could not be admitted
because they are physical evidence and only relevant if
tied to the defendant under the Rule 104(b) standard?
This would seem to make little or no sense, and the gut
reaction of any experienced judge or lawyer is that it
must be wrong. They are right. It is wrong.

Why Is It Wrong?

It is wrong because the prosecution is not entitled to ask
the jury to use evidence as being a genuine or authentic anything without sufficient evidence for the jury to
find by a preponderance of the evidence that it is what
the government claims. In other words, the prosecution cannot ask the jury to infer or conclude something
without an adequate evidentiary basis.
If the trial judge were to admit the statements based
on the officer’s hearsay testimony at a hearing, the
prosecution would have succeeded in offering no
admissible evidence to justify asking the jury to find

that the statements were made by the defendant. The
statements would be in evidence, would prove nothing,
and might in the end have to be stricken as irrelevant
or as confusing under Rule 403.

What Is Right?

The bottom line is that any party wanting the jury to find
that something is what that party claims it is must satisfy Rule 104(b). To say, for example, that a website is
the defendant’s, there must be sufficient evidence for the
jury to find not just that there is a website with material
on it, but also that the defendant operated that website. The proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient
foundational facts for the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the website is the defendant’s.
Under Rule 104(b), the judge is not a fact finder—the
judge is a fact screener who decides whether there is sufficient evidence for the jury to make the required finding.
If, however, evidence is properly authenticated but
is also hearsay (such as the statements on the hypothetical website), the judge must use the Bourjaily
standard discussed in Harvey and, in order to satisfy
Rule 801(d)(2)(A), make the requisite finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made
the statements. In making this ruling, the judge is a
fact finder.

Conclusion

The simple hypothetical demonstrates that the proponent of any evidence always must satisfy Rule 104(b)
in order to be permitted to ask a jury to conclude that
evidence is what the proponent claims it is. When
the evidence is hearsay, the proponent must also satisfy the hearsay rule and offer evidence (that need not
itself be admissible) that enables the judge to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is an exemption or exception that supports admission. The fact
that evidence is hearsay does not remove the need for
authentication; it means that in addition to authenticating the evidence and thereby satisfying Rule 104(b),
the proponent must also satisfy the hearsay rule and
satisfy Rule 104(a). n
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